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Forms and Functions: Life-Anatomy or Physiology? 
Explicit Definition: To maintain consistency and coherence of thought within this text 
all uses of the term “form” should be taken as; “Shape, arrangement of parts, visible 
aspect (esp. apart from colour).”1 This connotation of form is only to be understood 
as outward appearance or constitution of material entities. In no way is form to be 
taken in the Aristotelian, Platonic, or any philosophical sense; but as an aggregate of 
parts in functional relation to the environment. Any use of the term ‘form’ in quoted 
texts that does not reflect this usage will be changed by the author to essence, and 
will be annotated with an * and referenced in the footnotes. 
Introduction to the Distinction 
All forms of human centered communication are metaphors for experience. 
Humans use metaphors in an attempt to communicate internal concepts and 
connections of experience to others. Prelingual humans communicated past 
experience through the presence of physical markers which represented the 
experience of others. Before humans could speak, others’ experience was represented 
metaphorically through paths worn by travel. A well-traveled path represented a 
desirable experience; water, food, shelter. Later in human history experience was 
metaphorized in pictograph form. Conveying experience imperative to existence like 
hunting grounds and practices. As human culture progressed so did systems of 
metaphors used to analogize experience and convey internal content others. 
                                                          
1
 (Fowler & Fowler, p. 448) 
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 “Through analogies, the ‘invisible becomes visible,’ said Paracelsus2. For the 
resemblances are neither useless nor unwarranted.”3 To understand the world we are 
a part of, humans attempt to systematize metaphors used to convey 
conceptualizations of experience for a more coherent world view. The most 
structured system of metaphors is science. A problem with contemporary science is it 
seems to forget that theories used to explain phenomena of life and experience are 
inherently metaphoric. Theories are not actual representations of phenomena present 
to experience, they are an attempt to communicate abstracted experience and 
expected regularity. “We have become so used to the atomistic machine view; the 
world that originated with Descartes that we have forgotten that it is a metaphor. We 
no longer think as Descartes did that the world is like a clock. We think it is a clock.”4 
To better understand the experienced world, it is imperative to examine the cycles of 
thought that were contingent on preferred metaphoric description of the time they 
emerged. “In the study of living beings, history displays a pendulum movement, 
swinging to and fro between the continuous and the discontinuous, between structure 
and function, between the identity of phenomena and the diversity of beings.”5 
Webster and Goodwin assert; “A requirement for any experimental or 
theoretical work in a science is an adequate conceptualization of the object or the 
domain in which a phenomenon occurs.”6 Terminology used to aid in 
conceptualization of scientific concepts has an effect in dictating understanding of a 
concept as well as epistemic tools and goals. “Modes of description and theoretical 
                                                          
2
 Paracelsus was a 16
th
 century physician known for founding the science of toxicology 
3
 (Jacob, p. 21) 
4
 (Lewontin, p. 14) 
5
 (Jacob, p. 16) 
6
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 15) 
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explanation are conditioned by the ontological and epistemological theories which are 
available or fashionable and any conceptual system represents a historical choice 
from a number of possibilities.”7 Historical choice of ontological and epistemic tools, 
can be correlated to dominant social, political, and cultural predilection of the time 
in which a concept emerged. 
Evolution of meaning of organismic life, and metaphors used to describe it have 
been examined by philosophers of science such as Georges Canguilhem who, 
“Spotlighted the discontinuities in the conceptualization of life from antiquity to 
present, tracing life as animation, life as mechanism, life as organization, and finally, 
life as information.”8 Metaphors used to describe organisms and their processes have 
gone through varying incarnations. Humans have a tendency to conceptualize complex 
phenomenon in language that is culturally relevant. Use of culturally relevant 
terminology can lend itself to greater conceptualization not only in the scientific 
community but in society as a whole.  
What is relevant to society becomes not only the metaphor of scientific 
explanation but also provides the goal of science, inherent in the metaphor.  
Metaphors used to frame a scientific problem also outline expected knowledge that 
can be garnered through experimentation. An example being; description of genetic 
material being dubbed the genetic code, implicitly leads to a goal of deciphering the 
code. Scientific metaphors use culturally relevant terminology to outline goals of 
science that are pertinent to culture during that time. 
                                                          
7
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 15) 
8
 Georges Canguilhem, “Epistemology of Biology,” 1994; as cited in (Kay, p. 40) 
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An ineffable experience, thus concept, is life. Life cannot be simply defined 
though descriptions and criteria to accurately represent phenomenon. It is of no 
surprise attempts to do so require some amount of abstraction. Depending on choice 
of abstraction; it leads to an overemphasis of one aspect of the phenomenon, while 
ignoring another. In the science of life two chosen emphases are mechanism and 
vitalism, nature and nurture, the list of dichotomies describing life and its process 
could continue. Theories concerning organismal development as presented in the 
vitalist view of Weismann and the mechanistic perspective of Wolpert, as discussed 
later, are theories that would appear to be contradictory but are both accepted 
biological generalizations, laws, within contemporary biology. With an analysis of 
underlying historical discontinuities in biology an understanding can be explicated of 
how the nature versus nurture dichotomy continues to be present in modern biology. 
Susan Oyama has lead the call from developmental system theorists (DST) to 
eliminate dichotomous views in biology. DST is; “a general theoretical perspective on 
development, heredity and evolution. It is intended to facilitate the study of 
interactions between the many factors that inﬂuence development without reviving 
‘dichotomous’ debates over nature or nurture, gene or environment, biology or 
culture.”9  Overall the scientific community is in agreement that life and 
development of organisms is interactional. Genetic interacts with environmental 
influences for organismal organization; but beating the dead horse of the nature 
versus nurture dichotomy continues, due to contemporary conceptual frame of 
‘biological information’ and conceptual history of Western thought. Oyama states she; 
                                                          
9
 (Griffiths & Gray, p. 417) 
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“Would like nothing better than to stop beating him,10 but every time I 
think I am free of him he kicks me and does rude things to the 
intellectual and political environment. He seems to be a phantom horse 
with a thousand incarnations, and he gets more and more subtle each 
time around…What we need here, to switch metaphors in midstream, is 
the stake-in-the-heart move, and the heart is the notion that some 
influences are more equal than others, that essence*, or its modern 
agent, information, exists before the interactions in which it appears 
and must be transmitted to the organism either through genes or by the 
environment. This supports and requires just the conceptions of dual 
developmental processes that make up the nature-nurture complex. 
Compromises don’t help because they don’t alter this basic 
assumption”11 
Science cannot stop beating the dead horse of the nature versus nurture 
dichotomy, because it is not dead it has been unknowingly resuscitated through 
attempts to extinguish it. Through a continued cycle of emphasis on mechanistic or 
vitalistic attributes of life, the nature versus nature dichotomy has thrived in 
different permutations depending on choice of popular science and intellectual 
traditions of the time. The trajectory of contemporary science is not that of 
narrowing epistemic practices to produce objective facts. The trajectory of science is 
a choice made through influence of what is relevant to society and the science is 
                                                          
10
 Stop beating the “dead horse” 
*Original text states form in place of essence. 
11
 (Oyama, pp. 26-27) 
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emerging in. This has led to a hazy conceptualization of complex processes involved in 
ontogeny, reasserting a dichotomous view that the vitalistic aspects of life are 
somehow set apart from physical mechanistic actualization. 
A science in desperate need of a conceptual, thus metaphoric, realignment is 
biology. Biology is the study of life. To illustrate need for a realignment of biology, 
two accepted descriptions of criteria of life will be examined. Then a historical 
perspective concerning intellectual climates that have continued the conceptual 
disconnect of organismal life will be analyzed. The two most recent illustrations of 
conceptual bifurcation of life; biological specificity and biological information will 
illustrate implications of this division. Lastly a structuralist account of biological life 
will be explicated in a hope that it will align with goals of developmental biology as 
outlined by proponents of the movement diverging from classical views of biological 
science, developmental systems theory. 
Defining Life 
The opening line of a college level introductory biology textbook states; “An 
organism is a life-form―a living entity made up of one or more cells. Although there is 
no simple definition of life that is endorsed by all biologists, most agree that 
organisms share a suite of five fundamental characteristics.”12 The five characteristics 
outlined in this text are; energy, cells, information, replication, and evolution. Energy 
is the attribute of life to account for need to acquire and use energy from 
environmental sources; provided to photosynthesizing organisms through 
photosynthesis and its necessary component processes, non-photosynthesizing 
                                                          
12
 (Freeman, p. 1) *The following summary of the five characteristics are the author’s; description in full on pages 
1-2 of the text. 
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organisms through cellular metabolization13 and its necessary components. Cells are 
units that constitute organisms or a colony,14 that exhibit organization or order bound 
by semi-permeable membranes that permit passing of nutrients and energy to the 
inner constitution. Information is both transgenerational and environmental factors in 
which cellular organization occurs. Replication is a philosophically and scientifically 
fuzzy matter, this text uses an interesting metaphor stated by François Jacob to 
conceptualize the point; “The dream of a bacterium is to become two bacteria.”15 
Evolution is given an unsatisfactory tautologous description; “Organisms are the 
product of evolution, and their populations continue to evolve.”16 With such a 
nonconcrete description of life, it is understandable not all biologist agree on a 
definition of object of their study, life. 
 The second description is also taken from a college level introductory biology 
text published a year earlier than the first. Considering that these texts are 
contemporary, aimed at the same audience, and have a goal of systemizing thought; a 
hope would be that their conceptual content concerning the most basic principle 
would correlate well. The second text does not acknowledge incomplete agreement 
of specialists in the field of biology concerning definition and description of life. The 
text introduces the subject of life boldly stating; “All living things share five basic 
properties passed down over millions of years from the first organisms to evolve on 
earth: Cellular organization, metabolism, homeostasis, growth and reproduction, and 
                                                          
13
 Metabolization-act of metabolizing; all the chemical reactions occurring in a living cell or organism 
14
 Colony-An assemblage of individuals. May refer to an assemblage of semi-independent cells or to a breeding 
population of multicellular organisms. (Freeman, p. G:7) 
15
 (Freeman, p. 2) 
16
 (Freeman, p. 2) 
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heredity.”17 One aspect of life that can be agreed upon between these two texts18 is 
that there are five attributes of a living system. They do not use the same 
terminology, but possibly the terms correlate? 
 In text B cellular organization refers to organization of multicellular organisms 
or in a single celled organism. This feature of life correlates to text A’s second 
criteria of life, cells. The important similarity of organization in these two 
descriptions of cells, is that of the semipermeable membrane. The important 
distinction between these attributes that illustrates discontinuities within biology is 
that A’s definition requires “cells” not “cell” constitute life. While most unicellular 
organisms live as a group or colony; description A does not include a single celled 
organism as “alive” without assemblage of other individuals. By not allowing an 
individual single celled organism as possessing life, text A appears to be privileging 
the role of function over form. In the opening of text A it is granted that a single cell 
is an organism and a life form, the criteria requires multiple cells for function of life. 
In A’s formulation a singular cell cannot function alone to constitute the form life; 
whereas text B view a single celled organism as fulfilling the form of life and 
functions. While descriptions of cells juxtaposed with cellular organization seem to 
share important similarities when describing life; there is still a conceptual disconnect 
between formulations of life by experts in the field of biology. 
 Metabolism is the second criteria within text B, and can be correlated to text 
A’s first criteria of energy. There are no obvious discrepancies in conceptualization of 
                                                          
17
 Emphasis in original text (Johnson & Losos, p. 3) The five attributes are summarized by the author; full 
description in text p. 3. 
18
 For ease of comparison between texts the first text analyzed, Freeman, will be referred to text A and the second, 
Johnson will be referred to as text B. 
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this attribute, just an interesting distinction of conceptual priority. Energy is input 
and output of the mechanism of metabolism. Text A emphasizes vitalistic function, 
where text B emphasizes form or mechanism supporting function. While seemingly 
similar metabolism and energy as a criteria for life, highlight different aspects of this 
phenomenon. This foreshadows later discussion concerning historical intellectual 
climates that have influenced contemporary science. 
 The third criteria of text B is homeostasis; “All living things maintain stable 
internal conditions so their complex processes can be better coordinated.”19 This is an 
important element of life’s processes that cannot be directly correlated to any 
criteria in text A. All cellular processes are regulated by what is analogized in science 
as negative feedback.20 The environment induces stress and change on an organismal 
system, and the system responds to maintain stable internal conditions, to continue 
life. 
 The fourth criteria of text B is growth and reproduction; “All things grow and 
reproduce.” The fourth criteria of text A replication somewhat correlates with this 
principle. There are discrete and contested differences between the terms replication 
and reproduction that go beyond aim of this text. For this purpose it will be accepted 
that replication and reproduction carry a close enough conceptual resemblance. What 
is of import is text A’s oversight of growth. A possible reason may be in line with text 
A’s preference towards functions of life over forms in which it presents itself. 
                                                          
19
 (Johnson & Losos, p. 2) 
20
 Negative Feedback-A self-limiting, corrective response in which a deviation in some variable (e.g., body 
temperature, blood PH, concentration of some compound) triggers responses aimed at returning the variable to 
normal. (Freeman, p. G:20) 
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 The fifth criteria of text B is heredity. In this text heredity is discussed 
completely in terms of the genetic system, specifically the DNA molecule. This can be 
correlated to criteria four of A, information. While they are correlated; there is a 
distinct conceptual difference between information as posed in text A, and heredity 
in text B exclusively related to molecular DNA. Information in text A accounts for 
environmental and hereditary influences on life and development. Heredity in text B 
only accounts for molecular form, subjugating function of the molecule to its form. 
Text B does not include evolution as a criteria for life, as text A does. Evolution 
is acknowledged previous to enumerating the properties shared by life. This could be 
because of assumptions behind evolution are difficult to analogize without falling into 
empty tautologous statements, as text A did. Another reason may be related to 
seemingly differing emphases between texts on either form or function of life. 
Evolution is a function of life, not a form of life.  
An interesting note about text A, is what is introduced in the description but 
not in the criteria is evolution. It also does not mention homeostasis as criteria or 
within the initial description. This puts an overall presupposition on group or external 
dynamic of the life. What is mentioned in text B’s introduction but not in the criteria, 
is the individual entity has autonomy of life within the system. The emphasis is on 
internal members of the system as representative of life. Overall text A appears to be 
concerned with what can be construed or distinguished as functions of forms of life, it 
places physiology over anatomy. Whereas text B emphasizes forms that convey the 
functions, physiology is subjugated to anatomy. Biology is in need of a conceptual 
realignment to agree on object of their inquiry; what is life? 
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A second imperative question facing biology, is development of an organism. 
The question of development is of an individual organism, as well as development of 
species through evolutionary time for actualization of an individual. These two texts 
illustrate how descriptions and prioritization of form or function, as guiding principle, 
can translate into other conceptual difficulties. It can be agreed upon that 
development of an organism plays a role in life, but this role can be framed with an 
emphasis on either form or function. 
Text A describes development as; “The entire series of events that occurs 
between the fertilization and maturity is called development. During development, 
cells become progressively more specialized or differentiated.”21 These are functions 
of development, specialization and differentiation. There is no discussion of forms of 
anatomical components that actualize this function. 
Text B describes development within an organismal system as; “An individual 
develops as cells divide, move, or expand in a directed way; begin to express certain 
genes rather than others; and signal to each other about where they are, what they 
are doing, and what type of cell they are becoming. In addition selected cells die in a 
regulated manner during development.”22 This text emphasizes physical entities and 
relationship that constitute function of development. This description discusses a 
particular gene23 being expressed over another. Genes are loosely associated to 
physical structures within DNA. Also type of cell is accentuated in this description, 
                                                          
21
 (Johnson & Losos, p. 449) 
22
 (Freeman, p. 375) 
23
 Gene- A section of DNA (or RNA, in some viruses) that encodes information for building one or more related 
polypeptides or functional RNA molecules along with the regulatory sequences required for its transcription. 
(Freeman, p. G:12) 
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placing primacy on anatomical forms that give actualization of function and 
development. 
An explication of these two contemporary biological texts, illustrates the 
contemporary conceptual bifurcation of the object of study life and development. 
This shows how when systemized metaphors are attempted in science, there is a 
necessary abstraction of phenomenon for it to be represented.  Abstraction of 
phenomenon puts an emphasis on either vitalistic functions of organisms and their 
physiology, or on mechanistic forms of organismal anatomy. To develop a more 
coherent conceptualization of the phenomenon of life it is necessary to analyze this 
bifurcation and historical climates that have reified, and thus lead to this distinction 
of form or function, anatomy or physiology as holding primacy in life.  
The Development of Life’s History 
The problem that can be loosely described as that of nature versus nurture has 
persisted for millennia in Western thought. The seeming necessity to give a privileged 
role to either external or internal leads to the requirement of a central directing 
agency of development informing an organism either within organismic DNA or from 
the external environment directing organization from outside in. The requirement of 
a fruitful science is an adequate conceptualization of phenomenon attempting to be 
explained. To understand conceptual missteps within biology it is necessary to 
examine historical ideas that informed contemporary conceptualization of the object 
of biology, life. 
The distinction between vitalism and mechanism, epigenesis and preformation, 
holism and atomism, nature and nurture can be traced as far back in Western thought 
14 | P a y n e  
 
as Democritus and Aristotle. “The Greeks laid one of the main foundations of Western 
culture. The first traces of vitalism and mechanism can already be found in their 
philosophy of nature. While Democritus proposed an atomistic theory, his opponent 
Aristotle formulated a holistic and teleological24  philosophy of nature.”25 What these 
longstanding distinctions have in common is that they are in reference to life, 
thought, or knowledge but put an emphasis on either vitalistic internal self-directed 
organization system dictating function of an entity, or on mechanistic physical form in 
which function is processed. A popular metaphor in circulation currently is that of 
input and output in relation to a computer; mechanistic thought would explain all 
forms of the system composing function, vitalists would explain the system in terms of 
overall function guiding interaction of forms.   
Biology has been influenced by two differing modes of theory, vitalism and 
mechanism, which have taken different incarnations over history, dependent on 
popular ideas of the time. When science is emphasizing the vitalistic aspects of life, 
the object of inquiry is the vitalizing force, the essential characteristic of life. In the 
vitalistic perspective, “A conception of a whole in which the parts have no autonomy 
or intrinsic properties, their nature following from that of the whole as the expression 
of some ‘central’ unifying or directing agency, usually conceived as being non-
material, an ‘Idea’ or ‘soul.’”26  
Aristotle was one of the first philosophers of Western thought that there is 
extant evidence of philosophy he espoused. His philosophy has been influential 
                                                          
24
 Teleology-The philosophical theory that all things in nature have a purpose and happen because of that. (Fowler 
& Fowler, p. 938) 
25
 (De Klerk, p. 3) 
26
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 16) 
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through history and continuing into contemporary times. “In the Middle Ages 
Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy provided the unifying framework, which was 
marvelously suited to the description of living beings in terms of teleology and 
wholeness.”27 Vital essence which is described in Aristotelian philosophy places an 
emphasis on function of life and its entities as a defining characteristic. Inchoate 
matter was informed by a vital force.  Physical forms of organisms were of only 
secondary study to the function that they exhibited. The atomistic parts of organisms 
are present but the function that they display is object of study. 
The view of development and organismal genesis in the Aristotelian view is 
epigenesis. “The epigenist assumed a vital force by virtue of which the organism 
obtained its different organs during a formative and teleologically directed process of 
growth.”28 It was a directing force that was internal to the actualized organism that is 
responsible for epigenesis. The non-material guiding entity of an organism is 
responsible for presence and functions of life. It is through necessary functions of life 
for which physical manifestation of form actualizes itself. 
The opposing emphasis of a mechanistic nature can be seen in the philosophy 
of Democritus as; “A conception positing atomic events together with the 
‘mechanical’ interaction of autonomous units possessing certain intrinsic 
properties.”29 This view can be seen back to antiquity in the atomist philosophy of 
Democritus. It is physical three dimensional units interacting in nature, form, which 
defines functions within the physical world. This places an emphasis on external 
                                                          
27
 (De Klerk, p. 1) 
28
 (De Klerk, p. 7) 
29
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 16) 
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qualities of parts of the system, prominence is on the external as a unifying directing 
force. It is the boundary in which parts interact that primacy lies in the mechanistic 
formulation of life.  
The developmental and genesis of organisms in a preformationists view is; “A 
germ contains each part of the body in miniature; each part simply grows and nothing 
new appears.” This formation of development and genesis presupposes an importance 
on a central directing agent that is external to the individual atomistic part. Physical 
components of organisms express life inherently. There is not an essence internal to 
the organism as a singular presence that allows for presentation of an individual, each 
component part has its own nature and amalgamation of parts that presents the 
function. As far back as ancient Greece bifurcation of form or function as 
representation of organismal life has been present, and re-presents its self in varying 
manifestations through history of Western thought. 
An important indication of continued bifurcation of the conceptualization of 
life; can be seen in what Webster and Goodwin refer to as “German idealism” which 
is reflected in  philosophy of Immanuel Kant, and “Protestant Natural Theology” as 
represented by the philosophy of David Hume.30 Both philosophies have had a great 
influence on Western thought. They each represent a continued tradition of placing 
primacy of life on either function or the form. Kant represents the vitalist. In his 
‘Critique of Judgment;’ “Kant spells out in some detail the necessity of using 
teleological principles if biological organization is to be made intelligible.”31 There 
must be a function for the life form to be presented. Life cannot be present just 
                                                          
30
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 22) 
31
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 20) 
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through chance, there must be a principle or function present for physical 
manifestation to occur. This shows that Kant carries on the conceptual bifurcation of 
life placing an emphasis on the vitalistic nature of life as the factor that dictates life. 
On the other side of the fork is Natural Theology as represented by 
philosophical influence of David Hume. This incarnation of metaphoric description is 
aligned with mechanistic atomism of Democritus, emphasizing life conceptualized as; 
“Mechanical devices; that is as functional unities in which only structural relations are 
those of spatial contiguity.”32 There is no guiding purpose for formation of parts, 
through their formation of physical structures function is defined.  
This conceptualization of life also subjugates cause and effect to constant 
conjunction of observed phenomenon. Hume’s empiricist philosophy emphasized that 
only observable phenomenon could be object of scientific investigation. Cause never 
can be objectively discerned, all that is experienced is a “constant conjunction of 
events” that present an appearance of cause and effect. There is no cause for 
organismal life beyond contingent processes in which it presents itself. “The external 
functional relations of organisms considered in terms of the utility of the ‘part’ to the 
organism in relation to a particular mode of life in a particular environment. Internal 
functional relations, while by no means ignored, where relegated to a secondary 
status.”33 For Natural Theology the directing agency of life was externally guided 
through relation of physical parts, not a teleological function. 
Conceptual misalignment in biology of form versus function, mechanism versus 
vitalism can also be seen in two widely accepted, groundbreaking, influential theories 
                                                          
32
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 22) 
33
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 22) 
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in biology; Darwinian evolution and Mendelian genetics. Darwin’s theory of evolution 
is not based on observation of an individual or interaction of forms that produce a 
function. It is based on the function of evolution directing actualization of forms, 
which will provide apparatus for continued function. Darwin’s theory of evolution 
caries on the vitalist tradition, placing function of phenomenon as object of study 
over the form.34 
Mendelian genetics posed “unit factors,”35 as responsible for organismal 
development and life. Units present in parents are transferred through the act of 
fertilization to provide preexisting material forms that are actualized in organismal 
life. This formulation is directly correlated to ideas of preformation as seen in the 
mechanistic views of Democritus. Classic Mendelian theory represents one of many 
oscillations of thought from mechanism to vitalism, Mendelian genetics is a 
representation of the mechanistic. 
Both Mendelian genetics and Darwinian evolution showed progress in 
understanding complex phenomena of life and development. The Darwinian view 
emphasized vitalistic functional processes as imperative for presentation of life. 
Evolution became the modern conception of epigenesis; the teleological guiding force 
presenting as the nonmaterial entity and function of evolution. Mendelian genetics is 
inherently preformationists, thus mechanistic. Mendelian genetics accentuated 
unchanging units passed from generation to generation, placing a privileged role on 
preexisting material entities responsible for life and development. Though these 
theories have played an imperative role in contemporary conceptualization of life, 
                                                          
34
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 23) 
35
 (Moitra, p. 7) 
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they also represent two underlying presuppositions in history of biological thought; 
primacy on either form and its mechanistic characteristics, or function and its 
vitalistic nature. 
A final example of this conceptual bifurcation can be seen in germ36 theories of 
Weismann and Wolpert. With addition of microscope technology questions concerning 
the nature of organismal life moved from observation of macroscopic to that of 
microscopic phenomenon present at cellular level. Specifically physical entities in the 
nucleus of cells and their functions were given role of transmitting life. 
Friedrich Weismann represents continuation of the vitalist epigenesis tradition. 
Weismann believed; “The problem of inheritance is not primarily to be thought of in 
terms of how the structure of the parent is to be transmitted to the offspring, rather 
it is to be considered in terms of control of growth and development.”37 The 
highlighted aspect of this formulation of life and development is on function, control 
and growth; it subjugates importance of structure to function. Weismann believed in 
a structure within the germ cell that, “Has the power of developing into a complex 
organism.”38 He acknowledges structure but places it with a power beyond its 
structure. 
Developmental biologist Lewis Wolpert also made investigations into germ cells 
as imperative for presentation of new life. Unlike Weismann’s emphasis on  
controlling functions of cellular processes responsible for life, Wolpert emphasized 
spatial relations and order as presenting life. Wolpert proposed; “A co-ordinate 
                                                          
36
 Germ-a portion of an organism capable of developing into a new one (Fowler & Fowler, p. 379) 
37
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 27) 
38
 (Webster & Goodwin, p. 27) 
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system which assigned a unique positional label to every point within it. The 
boundaries of the domain were defined by external values (maxima or minima) of the 
co-ordinate system, generated by a mechanism which was not specified but 
assumed.”39 Director of this system was assumed as external to physical structure, 
through environmental influence, not a function inherent to a structure. 
Both Weismann’s and Wolpert’s descriptions of germ cells as imperative to life 
and development are accepted in contemporary biology today, their theses being 
quite similar but show a distinct bifurcation in primacy of either mechanistic or 
vitalistic nature. Weismann’s thesis can be summarized as; “Temporally or spatially 
organized variable in the external environment selected which particular set of 
determinants in the germ plasm would be expressed, and hence which of the possible 
alternative forms would be produced.”40 This formulation highlights a persistence of 
determinants in germ plasm that are triggered through environmental interaction to 
produce an organism. Form is selected through a function of interaction of 
environment and germ. Wolpert’s thesis can be summarized as; “Spatially organized 
variable in the internal environment (positional information) determines which 
particular set of genes in each member of a (necessarily) spatially distributed set of 
genomes will be expressed and hence, ultimately, which component part of the total 
form will be realized in that part of space.”41 Wolpert accentuates physical structure 
and location as object of investigation, showing a preference for mechanistic form 
over vitalistic function. 
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The way in which phenomenon is described places a primacy on either vitalistic 
or mechanistic attributes of life. The formulation of description provides the grid to 
which explanation is pinned. Metaphors used in a theory dictate observations which 
are deemed relevant. “In the dialogue between theory and experience, theory always 
has the first word. It determines the form of the question and thus sets limits to the 
answer.”42 Depending on theories espoused by popular science of the time, an 
emphasis is given to the mechanistic or vitalistic nature of life which outlines what 
phenomena can be object of investigation. The object of investigation dictates 
answers one is searching for.  
Informing Information 
Currently biological information is the chosen metaphor to describe 
phenomenon of life. The term information has been in common usage for centuries 
typically taken to mean; “Formation of mind and character, instruction and 
communicated knowledge.”43 This term was not used with scientific precision, but as 
a term to denote ineffable experiences of personal and cultural development that are 
imperative to human. Information is a somewhat empty metaphor, a catachresis, a 
signifier without a referent. If metaphors attempt to communicate internal states and 
expected regularity, any communication verbal or nonverbal could be construed as 
information. Even further, chemical signals such as pheromones44 that are not directly 
perceptible to experience could be deemed information. Anything internal or external 
to the system that stimulates perception and experience could be information.  
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In the late 1940’s two mathematicians Warren Weaver and Claude Shannon 
both introduced their theory of communication and information into discourse of 
science. This discipline was designed to formulate more efficient telephone systems, 
with the goal of transferring “information” through telephone wires.45 Warren Weaver 
introduced the term information into his theory with a definition differing from 
commonsense usage of the term.  Information was; “The capacity of a system to 
transmit any sequence of symbols depended solely on distinguishing at the receiving 
end between the results of various selections made at the sending end-not on the 
meanings of these sequences.”46 This means that for any system with an input and an 
output, where it can be discerned by output that there has been changes in input of 
the system. Weaver is quoted as saying, “The word ‘information’ in this theory 
[mathematical theory of communication] is used in a special sense that must not be 
confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must not be confused with 
meaning.”47 Information is a functional relationship that is not dependent on the 
medium which it is produced. 
Another application of the metaphor information to describe complex dynamic 
systems came about in the late 1940s from Norbert Wiener in cybernetics, a 
formalized notion of feedback. “Wiener transformed Schrödinger’s statistical 
mechanical arguments into an information discourse encompassing all self-regulating 
systems.”48 Weiner believed that information could be calculated as negative entropy. 
Information being the metaphor for organismal organization. Weaver and Shannon on 
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the other hand argued that information within a system could be calculated as 
entropy. If one could discern disorder of a system then organization would be the 
inverse. Weiner argued; “Just as the amount of information in a system is a measure 
of its degree of organization, so the entropy of a system is a measure of its degree of 
disorganization; and one is simply the negative of the other.”49 There seemed to be 
no difficulty with this for either mathematician or use within biology, it was seen as 
somewhat a mathematical pun. 50 
Because of the theoretical definition of information within the mathematical 
theory of communication and cybernetics, it seemed unproblematic to add it to the 
concepts of biology. Information carried by organisms could be discerned by regularity 
of offspring’s appearance being similar to the parent. In the Late 1950s mechanisms 
of phage replication as described by Delbrück and Gunther Stent, believed as many 
molecular biologist did “it would be unwise not (to) [sic] give some currency to 
‘information transfer’ as a possible replication mechanism.”51 This consideration 
heralded shift again to an emphasis on vitalistic characteristics of life. 
Biology has traditionally not been seen as an exact science such as physics or 
chemistry. It was only in decades after World War II that information became for the 
first time a “physical parameter and a precisely defined concept”52 Information as 
relating to discourse of biology emerged in an attempt to unify biology with sciences 
that showed a greater ability to make systematic and quantifiable theories, thus 
predictions. What is important to recognize about this choice of appropriation of 
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metaphor, is that information places an emphasis on internal vitalistic function of the 
system, as opposed to mechanical form of the system that actualizes function. 
The positive of this nonconcrete metaphor, is that it leant toward the goal of a 
unified science. Formulas derived from the mathematic theory of communication 
could be applied to model other systems. Formulas of the mathematic theory of 
communication greatly improved computer modeling and cybernetics. It would not be 
far for biology to reach out to this new discipline in an attempt to describe 
interactions within complex biological systems. Members of biological sciences who 
originally embraced this term understood its metaphoric value, and did not intend 
reinstantiating the idea of a vitalistic force in contemporary biology. 
What can be extrapolated from use of information within scientific lexicon is 
that information is the function of organisms and their interactions. It does not place 
any emphasis on content or physical form that carries information, only order of a 
system. Biological discourse framed on information shows the continued pendulum of 
scientific investigation swinging towards vitalistic description of life and its processes. 
Power of the biological system became metaphorized as a nonconcrete entity 
providing order, an unseen directing power on the physical form. 
The Space of Specificity 
Previous to addition of biological information to the scientific lexicon biological 
phenomena was described using the metaphor of specificity. Biological specificity is 
related to corresponding or complementary spatial configurations between biological 
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systems.53 Specificity was conceptually grounded through the traditional lock and key 
model where a key/organism is constructed to fit a lock/environment. The lock and 
key model of specificity is a simplification, as any abstraction of phenomena. What is 
lacking in the traditional lock and key model is dynamic vitalistic interaction between 
systems or parts of systems that relate to produce complex biological phenomena 
inherent in specificity as defined by developmental biologist Paul Weiss.  
Paul Weiss gave an in depth description of phenomena that can be tied 
conceptually to the term specificity, and attempted to tie terminology and 
phenomena in biology to known phenomena in the realm of physical and chemical 
science. “We must treat cells as physical systems in space and time, endowed with 
definable properties which are subject to the limitations of all physical bodies and 
their laws of behavior.”54 Weiss’ object of study was the cellular level, but his 
description of specificity based on “molecular ecology”55 can be extended to larger 
systems. This elegant ten point description of interactions within biological systems 
can be conceptually correlated to the dynamic interaction that is biological specificity 
in the development of organisms and their environment.  
“The concept formulated in these ten points takes into account the 
growing realization that the structural and working order of the cell is 
based not on the presence of a fixed mechanical framework pervading it 
abundantly disproved by the facts but on a regular distribution in space 
of the various intracellular processes: a dynamic rather than static 
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skeleton, maintained by metabolic energy and determined in its 
characteristics by some definite geometrical order in the field of its 
operation.”56  
The ten points are summarized, including mechanistic implications as follows; 57 
1. Each system is made of numerous types of species of different composition, size,          
densities, rank and stability. Some segments of a system occur in relatively constant 
symbiotic groupings. Species are described completely by their physical and chemical 
composition. Some species interact in a relatively constant manner due to their 
physical and chemical constitution being complementary. This description of 
interaction is completely mechanistic, atomic parts interact within the environment 
and because of this interaction of parts, function emerges. 
2. One of the fundamental characteristics of a system is that various species of the 
system are not self-sufficient, but are dependent in various degrees on other 
members of the population, as well as physical conditions within space they occupy. 
Survival and function of the system is predicated on presence of all necessary species. 
A system cannot consist of only a single species. It is necessary for survival of the 
system for species to interact within physical space. From the presence of physical 
species dependent upon each other a function emerges from interaction of parts. A 
mechanism must have a variety of cogs and wheels for a function to arise. 
3. Interactions between species only occur within a limited range of conditions 
specific for its kind. These conditions are “existential and operational prerequisites”58 
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for each species or group. Existential and operational prerequisites of a species, 
refers to spatial configuration of a given environment59  as well as chemical 
composition of the environment. A species cannot exist in a system without already 
existent chemical configuration and gradation. DNA only maintains its structure in 
specific conditions with an addition of heat or chemicals it becomes denatured. This 
is what is meant by existential and operational prerequisites; already present 
chemical and physical conditions which attract a diversity of species necessary for the 
system’s operation. The use of existential and operational prerequisites, is a purely 
mechanistic description. 
4. If specific existential and operational prerequisites for various species differ at 
different sites within the system, species will automatically segregate into their 
appropriate environment. Due to environmental affinity an indiscriminate mixture of 
species can be sorted into a definite spatial pattern. Due to already existent 
conditions of the environment in which a system is instantiated, species will segregate 
appropriately to their preferences. Cogs and other parts of a clock automatically 
segregate depending on fit and preference of interaction. The mechanism self 
organizes, the emphasis is on the parts. 
5. The fifth criteria clearly summarizes earlier criteria giving more description to 
interactions of species from the micro order to the macro, and cannot be summarized 
with justice. 
“While the conditions and forces which determine the molecular 
regrouping are of the most diverse sorts; electric charges, surface 
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28 | P a y n e  
 
tensions, coacervation60, solubility, chemical affinities, adsorption, 
enzyme-substrate relations, mobility, elasticity, etc.-their resultant in 
each case is of such character as to insure relative stability of 
composition, density, and localization of the given group of species. As 
they combine, larger units of supramolecular, submicroscopic, and 
finally, of microscopic order arise, each durable or "viable" only in a 
particular typical constellation of conditions.”61 
Species within a system interact to form larger systems. Systems on a cellular level 
form tissues, which form organs, then organisms, populations, and eventually 
ecosystems, each durable or "viable" only in a particular typical functional relational 
set of conditions. Levels of mechanistic complexity emerge through atomistic 
interaction. 
6. Organization in space and content of the system and its constituents set the frame 
for later settlement of different members of species, giving existential and 
operational prerequisites of new members of the system. Organization is based on all 
surfaces and interfaces of constituents of a system. External aspects of species of a 
system and their interaction define function of the system, and exclusion or inclusion 
of new species to the mechanism of the system. 
7. A given boundary/surface62 of a system will favor integration of particular species 
that will concentrate that area and crowd out other species not equally fit to that 
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system. Surfaces of the mechanistic species favor integration of species that fit within 
physical chemical and spatial organization already present. 
8. Surface species of a system have a unique role in determining events within its 
interior; “They assume the functional properties of membranes”63. Species control 
and select transfer of substances between systems they divide. Through aggregation 
of mechanistic components function rises out of the system. 
9. Boundary/surface species will become fixed into an interface, and force a definite 
orientation relative to that interface below its surface. This will form an orderly array 
to which layers within the interior can become fixed. A stacking up process is initiated 
through which organization can be gradually extended into the interior, creating an 
increasing diversity of conditions as it proceeds. Function of the system emerges 
through organization from the external stable appearance, to internal interplay of 
mechanisms. 
10. If conditions change along the boundary/surface so that they are no longer 
compatible with existential and operational prerequisites of the boundary/ surface 
species, a new assortment of species better fitted to the situation will take position 
as the interface that will set new organization for the interior, leading to an alternate 
fate of the system. When enough pressure is applied to a system, a watch for 
example, the systems environmental conditions change no longer fulfilling existential 
and operational conditions. In this system parts of the watch once disengaged would 
regroup with other mechanisms to form other systems; possibly aggregate with other 
mechanisms to form more watches, or to become mechanisms within a radio. 
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While the ten points formulated attempt to provide a non-anthropomorphic 
based description of phenomena, describing interaction in a mechanistic and 
atomistic way, leads to the system being directed from outside. The boundary 
determines membership into the system. Placing emphasis entirely on mechanical 
aspects of life; leads to the need to assert a central directing agency dependent on 
the form of life, not function. The pendulum of science again shifted to an atomistic 
mechanistic view of life with introduction of specificity to the scientific lexicon. 
“Thus with the start of the nineteenth century, a new science was to appear. Its aim 
was no longer to classify organisms, but to study the processes of life; its object of 
investigation was no longer the visible structure, but organization.”64  Discourse of 
organization was to discover “life’s grand design.”65 With organization being object of 
study, specificity was an important tool in understanding organization. Problems and 
experiments of the 1930s and 1940s were framed in discourse of functional 
specificities.66 “Specificities dictated and governed successive cycles of life.”67 
Specificity of structures interacting to form organized biological organisms was the 
space for scientific advancement and understanding. 
“Experimental studies showed that genes were highly specific with 
respect to gene products; enzymes exhibited a high degree of specificity 
for their substrates; the binding of antigen and antibody became an 
index of specificity in immunology and related fields; bacteria and 
viruses where often characterized with respect to their host-range 
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specificities; taxonomies of species were established based on 
experimentally measured serological68 differences.”69 
Proteins became focus of biological investigation, as imperative players in 
organization of complex organisms. The question of how biological specificity was 
transmitted across generations focused on proteins as bearer of specificity. “Of all 
the macro- and microelements conjoined in the organization of perpetuation of the 
body, proteins came first, privileged as the ontological substance of life. As the 
material representatives of heredity, at least until the early 1950s, they bore 
biological and chemical specificity.”70 Previous to discoveries of DNA as the self-
replicating molecule, proteins were thought to hold secrets of organizational 
specificity, thus secrets of life. “Across the life sciences, the lock-and-key metaphor 
served as an exchange medium, a conceptual and experimental bridge, which related 
form to function along the material continuum of biological specificity, from species 
to molecule.”71 
While language of specificity had mechanistic conceptual backing, it did not 
provide an explanation for biological processes, just abstracted conceptualization of 
the processes. “In many instances the term specificity possessed more of a 
metaphorical quality and heuristic value than operational force. Unless detailed 
through some kind of concrete structure, measure, mechanism, and experimental 
procedure, specificity was not really an explanation (explanan) but that which needed 
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explaining (explnandum).”72 Specificity may have required an explanation, but there 
was an agreed upon physical description of the lock and key which provided it with 
conceptual backing.  
Metaphoric language is necessary for formation of conceptual problems. 
Language to describe a problem cannot be seen also as its answer. “The main 
objection to symbolic expressions of this kind comes from the fact that instead of 
formulating the problems, they merely label them. We may not be able to dispense 
with such descriptive terms for some time to come, but we must guard against giving 
them any explanatory value.”73 Mysteries of life and experience are not locks and 
keys but appearance of biological components complimentary interaction can be 
conceptualized in a way that resembles a lock and key. Describing interactions of life 
through a mechanistic view of specificity, leads to the assumption that function of a 
system naturally arise from the atomic parts. This leaves an emphasis on a directing 
force external to the parts. A description is given of the system, but there is still a 
nonmaterial entity directing assemblage of the system from outside, as opposed to 
nonmaterial information internal to the system.  
Developmental Systems Theory; A Structured View of Life 
In 1986, Arbib and Hesse asserted, “Scientific revolutions are, in fact, 
metaphoric revolutions, and theoretical explanations should be seen as metaphoric 
redescription of the domain and phenomena.”74  An attempt to understand complex 
biological systems has continually lead to conceptual bifurcation, asserting two 
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separate streams directing the organism, discussed earlier as vitalism or mechanism, 
function or form, information or specificity. A description is needed to capture both 
mechanistic and vitalistic nature of biological phenomenon. Susan Oyama has lead the 
call from developmental system theorists (DST) to eliminate dichotomous views in 
biology. DST is; “a general theoretical perspective on development, heredity and 
evolution. It is intended to facilitate the study of interactions between the many 
factors that inﬂuence development without reviving ‘dichotomous’ debates over 
nature or nurture, gene or environment, biology or culture.”75  
Advocates of DST believe the organism and the environment it is a part of have 
equal influence on development. The object of investigation should be the 
“developmental system,” the organism rooted within developmental context of the 
environment.76 Concepts and terminology used to describe theories concerning life 
and heritability have evolved through history, and are described through either 
mechanistic or vitalistic metaphors that are culturally relevant for the time.  
Proponents of DST would like to eliminate conceptual dichotomies in science and 
society as a whole. The first step to eliminate dichotomous ideas, is a recognition of 
the continued presence and varying incarnations of dichotomies. Webster and 
Goodwin discuss a structuralist approach to description and theorizing concerning 
organisms, which possibly could be in line with stated goals of DST to eliminate this 
conceptual discrepancy. 
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“Structuralism is concerned with order, its generation and transformation it 
rejects both atomism and holism.”77 This does not entail that structuralist approach 
to organismal life rejects epistemic contributions of science. It does entail a differing 
conceptualization of organismal domain and life. Forms and functions of life deserve 
equal weight in theoretical description, as they are inseparable aspects of the same 
whole. Science cannot continue beating the dead horse of nature and nurture, genes 
and environment, mechanism and vitalism. All of these concepts are two sides of the 
same coin, life, they cannot be separated. When an attempt to separate or place 
primacy of action on one of these aspects, it leads to a conceptual disconnect, which 
results in an impediment to epistemic practices. 
There are three aspects to the structuralist formulation of organismal life. First 
wholeness; “Structures are wholes, firstly, in the sense that they have the property of 
maintain themselves in being while their elements change, hence they are not 
reducible to the sum of their elements.”78 This conceptualization of organisms as 
structures, thus wholes, gives weight to the physical forms present. Allowing for the 
incorporation of new members while old members of the structure degrade, but still 
the wholeness of the structure is maintained. The function is that of being a whole 
and this function is realized through the dynamic interchange of parts internal and 
external to the structure. 
The second aspect of organismal life from a structuralist perspective is related 
to transformations. “Because structures obey laws there is a restriction on the 
‘coherent’ forms which are possible; that is the potential set of transformations is a 
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logically closed set, though not necessarily finite…individual organisms can undergo 
specific transformations as a consequence of internal or external perturbation.”79 
There is an emphasis on restrictions of coherent form, which allows for organisms to 
transform in a law governed way dependent on the set of possibilities provided by the 
physiochemical constitution of both the organism and the environment at a given 
time. This aspect formulates a conception of life attempting to not emphasize 
external or internal directing, dictating primacy over a given life form. This aspect of 
the organism and life as structure allows for both the mechanistic and vitalistic 
experience of life to be accounted for. 
The third aspect of organisms as structures is self-regulation. This refers to; 
“The power of a structure to maintain a given member of the set of transformations 
in the face of perturbation.”80 By making reference to power it implies a function, but 
there is also a mention to the member, or form, in which the function is actualized. 
This allows for a change in physical composition and orientation of parts of an 
organism while maintaining its individual status. “Small continuous changes in 
parameters can result in either small, continuous changes of form, or in large, 
discontinuous alterations…”81 A caterpillar undergoes metamorphosis to a butterfly; 
there is a set of structured transformations of the physical entity in which the 
function of its parts alter, but still the same organism persists.  
These three conceptualizations of aspects of structure, or organismic life, does 
not imply a privileged role over the ever changing physical specificity of the 
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environment that which nurtures the organism, or the genetic nature of information 
which is an internal function of the physical forms of the organism. “Such a 
conceptualization is, of course, compatible with a variety of theories and does not 
necessitate any one particular theory.”82 This formulation of organism as structure 
can fit with any of the previous formulations of life as mechanistic form or vitalistic 
function. It does not exclude old theories, but explicates their shortcomings, not 
allowing for a view of form or function to be accentuated. The structural conception 
of organisms is inherently interactional. It allows for transformation with the 
appearance of constancy. 
The structuralist approach to organisms rejects both atomism and holism, 
vitalism and mechanism; as chosen metaphor for life. That is not to say that vitalist 
and mechanistic metaphors are wrong and in need of elimination, they are in need of 
integration. “Although exclusively atomistic conceptions of the organisms are 
untenable, that does not mean that atomistic association plays no role in biological 
phenomena: it takes its place in a larger scheme as a limiting case in which the set of 
potential forms has only one member. This larger scheme is a structuralist conception 
of the organism.”83 This can be construed as, the atomistic perspective is the static 
synchronic state of components of a system. Mapping specific orientation of chemical 
components, reducing the whole to its parts and orientation. The limiting case is the 
diachronic history, or level of order, which gives rise to the synchronic. The 
progression of mechanistic interaction over time dictated by physiochemical 
interaction gives rise to the whole, or vitalistic aspect of life dependent on the 
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previous state of the system. The atomic structure gives the space for function to rise 
in time through minute physiochemical changes to a system. 
 In a given environmental space there is a set of physical members of an extant 
system. All have specific chemical compositions and physical affinities. Within any 
given system due to both internal and external composition, governing laws limit 
actualization possible due to physiochemical relations in a particular time and place, 
dependent on the previous state of the system. There is not a preexisting essence 
that is in need of actualization, just physiochemical processes dependent on chance 
circumstances of the environment. Organismal development is a conditional process 
based on organization in physical three dimensional space progressing through time 
dictated by regularities of affinity based on physiochemical laws. Its members are 
that of already existing dynamic matter entering and exiting the system, changing and 
transforming due to formation and degradation from external and internal influences.  
A twist on the myth of the Ship of Theseus84 allows for illustration of how 
mechanistic and vitalistic perspectives can be married to produce a better 
understanding of development and evolution of life. This holds a place for specificity 
and information as equally important in the descriptive process. In ‘The logic of 
metabolism and its fuzzy consequences’ Danchin and Sekowska use the myth of the 
Ship of Theseus to illustrate “the border between permanence and change” that is 
key to metabolic processes as well as life.  An explication of the physical process of 
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altering a ship may help garner an understanding of how information and specificity 
can be integrated for a more comprehensive conceptualization of complex dynamic 
processes in which life presents itself. 
 This is an explanation concerning persistence and transitions of life, not 
formation of life in the universe. It will be accepted life is the product of a complex 
evolutionary past that cannot be definitively known, which occurred through purely 
physical processes. A twist on the myth of the ship of Theseus will illustrate how 
perturbation to a system over time may change the physical form  while maintaining 
coherence and continuity of a system; how specificity and information can integrate 
to dictate stability of a system while its physical constitution changes. The order 
within the ship is akin to information, defined by Wiener as negative entropy. The 
components forming the order can be correlated to specificity as outlined by Weiss. 
With the interaction of the vitalistic and the mechanistic a more coherent conception 
of life can occur. 
The ship in this illustration is dry docked but cared for in a similar manner as 
Theseus’ ship, and can be paralleled to a caterpillar. Reconstruction of the ship is its 
processes of life. As planks of the ship decay and are removed, pitch from within 
these planks are collected to be used as resin, to caulk addition of new planks. This 
can be correlated with metabolic processes where macromolecules are cleaved, and 
the resultant products are appropriated into other parts of the system. A new plank is 
added for each removed. This is akin to the appropriation of nutrition by the 
caterpillar, to sustain the processes of life the physical components must be added. 
The waste of the ship is used for fertilizer, the nutrients of which help an orchard to 
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grow that will be used as timber. All life produces waste that enriches the 
environment and other life forms. If those rebuilding the ship found because of a shift 
in the climate while altering the hull, it was needed to build walls to the ground, 
changing form to a barn. Organization is shifted, but maintains the same level of 
quantifiable order, information. Caterpillar becomes a chrysalis. Time passes and 
planks are continually added and rot. Those salvaging the ship are put under pressure 
by invaders and the shape of the barn slowly transforms into a church. A butterfly is 
produced. Again the level of order is maintained within the system while its physical 
manifestation changes over time, due to specific physical pressures and availability of 
resources. While the structure is being restored, it lives. A fire strikes the orchard, 
and no trees remain to form planks. The boat can no longer be restored its parts 
decay, becoming incorporated by other ordered systems. The butterfly dies, and 
enriches the environment. 
Within this description there is allowance for order, transformation, and 
generation. Despite alteration of its physical components an aspect of the ship 
maintained the same; “The mysterious attribute lies in the information carried by the 
relationships that link the planks together.”85 This statement seems inherently 
vitalistic. When taken with understanding information in this sense can be equated 
with negative entropy in the mathematical theory of communication as quantifiable 
order of a system, which is driven by mechanistic physiochemical interactions of 
specificity as outlined by Weiss. The level of order or information persists while the 
atomistic parts change through time. No physical entity is static, all life is a process 
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of breaking down and building organized structure driven by time and chemical 
affinity. “In a way, not so different form the build up of man-made crafts such as 
Theseus’ boat, atoms are combined into all the components of life, following certain 
informational rules. Obeying these rules, however cannot be strictly accurate. They 
have a fuzzy character associated to the inevitable thermal fluctuations.”86 
Taking the view of organism as structure, giving equal weight to both the 
vitalistic nature of genetic information and mechanistic nurture of physiochemical 
specificity, may lay the ground for a new description of life and its processes; such as 
that of the developmental system, or co-constructing lock and key as object of inquiry 
based on cycles of contingency dictated by purely physical processes. This formulation 
of organismal life, if adopted into the system of science may produce questions, thus 
epistemic goals that do not rely on dichotomous distinctions. With a new metaphor 
that does not imply primacy of vitalism or mechanism, a greater understanding of 
organisms and life could be conceptualized by science and thus society. We may 
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 Molecular Ecology 
 To speak symbolically of "affinities," is merely to outline the problem, not to attack it. It remains to 
resolve the described bio- logical phenomena into known phenomena of physical and chemical order. How such 
resolution could be envisaged will be indicated in the following. It will be essentially an elaboration of an earlier 
similar attempt to interpret cellular affinities in terms of molecular structure and organization. 
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 By way of preparation, it seems appropriate to transcribe the symbolic concepts of "cell" and 
"protoplasm" into terms of molecular phenomena. This transcription has a purely pragmatic purpose, namely, to 
create a more workable model of the cell. Its utility will soon become evident. It has led me to introduce a concept 
of the cell which can best be characterized as "Molecular Ecology." That is, a cell is to be viewed as an organized 
mixed population of molecules and molecular groups of the following properties and behavior.  
(1) Each population is made up of molecular species of very different composition, sizes, densities, rank, and 
stability, from trivial inorganic compounds to the huge and highly organized protein systems. Some segments of 
these populations occur in relatively constant "symbiotic" groupings, often of a limited size range; these form the 
various particulates of the cell content.  
(2) It is one of the fundamental characteristics of cellular organization that the various species constituting the 
population are not self-sufficient, but depend in various degrees upon other members of the population as well as 
upon the physical conditions prevailing in the space they occupy. Survival and orderly function of the total 
population are predicated on the presence of all essential members in definite concentrations, combinations, and 
distributions.  
(3) In view of this intricate interdependence, given molecular species can exist and given interactions between 
species can occur only within a certain limited range of conditions specific for each kind. We might call these 
conditions the "existential and operational pre- requisites" for each molecular species or group. The probability of 
members of a given species to persist, hence to be found, in any but the appropriate setting, would be extremely 
low. 
 (4) If the specific existential and operational prerequisites for the various molecular species and groups differ at 
different sites of the cell, different species will automatically become segregated into their appropriate ecological 
environments. As a result, even a wholly indiscriminate mixture can become sorted out into a definite space 
pattern. Certain species will assemble in relatively stable combinations, like biotic groups, while others, mutually 
incompatible, will separate.* 
 (5) While the conditions and forces which determine the molecular regrouping are of the most diverse sorts-
electric charges, surface tensions, coacervation, solubility, chemical affinities, adsorption, enzyme-substrate 
relations, mobility, elasticity, etc.-their resultant in each case is of such character as to insure relative stability of 
composition, density, and localization of the given group of species. As they combine, larger units of 
supramolecular, submicroscopic, and finally, of microscopic order arise, each durable or "viable" only in a 
particular typical constellation of conditions. 
 (6) Organization in space of the content of the cell, and of any of its constituent particulate elements as well, 
therefore, presupposes a primordial system of spatially organized "conditions" to set the frame for the later 
differential settlement of different members of the dispersed molecular populations. Such conditions can 
presumably only exist in systems with stability like solids. Systems answering this demand are presented by all 
surfaces and interfaces in the cell, which include the interfaces between one cell and another, between cell and 
medium, nucleus and cytoplasm, nudeolus and nuclear sap, chromosomes and nuclear matrix, chromatic and 
achromatic substance, as well as between all other formed cell components and the interstitial fluid. 
 (7) A given surface area of given constitution will therefore favor the adsorption of a given assortment of 
molecular species, which will thus concentrate in that area and thereby crowd out other species not equally fit to 
occupy that particular zone. In this manner, the various surfaces will gradually become settled by mosaics of 
"frontier populations" recruited from the subjacent territories. **  
(8) Owing to their frontier position, these surface populations acquire a unique role in determining the subsequent 
course of events in the interior. Without necessarily being morphologically distinct, they assume the functional 
properties of membranes. That is, they control the selective transfer of substances and energy between the 
molecular realms they divide. 
 (9) Polar molecules (e. g., the biologically prominent lipoproteins), in becoming fixed to an interface, are forced 
into a definite orientation relative to that interface, and hence, relative to one another. This orderly array makes it 
possible for the resulting polarized layer to serve now, in its turn, as a new surface along which further molecular 
layers from the interior can become fixed, with the selection depending on the physical and chemical properties of 
the free ends of the righted molecules of the first layer. Thus, a stacking up process is initiated through which 
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organization can be gradually extended into the interior, creating an increasing diversity of conditions as it 
proceeds. 
 (10) If the conditions along an interface change in such a manner that the new conditions are no longer 
compatible with the continued existence of the old frontier population, the latter will be crowded out by a new 
assortment of species better fitted to the new situation. As this new frontier population settles in the controlling 
master position, it sets a new master pattern for the events in the interior, causing the further fate of the cell to 
take a radically different turn. Different contact surfaces can thus entail qualitative changes in the cell by bringing 
different segments of the molecular population into the controlling surface positions. The concept formulated in 
these ten points takes into account the growing realization that the structural and working order of the cell is 
based not on the presence of a fixed mechanical framework pervading it-abundantly disproved by the facts-but on 
a regular distribution in space of the various intracellular processes: a dynamic rather -than static skeleton, 
maintained by metabolic energy and determined in its characteristics by some definite geometrical order in the 
field of its operation. This order we conclude to be an order of "conditions," going back in last analysis to the 
typical organization of surfaces-"organization" in this sense referring to the particular non-random distribution of 
physical and chemical properties (see later). Pending evidence to the contrary, it is also possible to view the 
organization of genes as residing in their surface properties. In other words, the organization pattern of many, and 
perhaps all, living systems can be derived from a two-dimensional ground plan to which the third dimension is 




*We are omitting here from consideration the fact that many large organic molecules, such as the native proteins, 
seem to undergo constant metabolic renovation, exchanging constituents with their environment, but preserving 
their identity.' In terms of our analogy, this is the counterpart of the turnover of cells within the individual 
members of an animal population. 
** Again for the sake of simplicity, we are ignoring here the fact that specific local conditions favor not only the 
adsorption of certain existing molecular species, but synthesis of new species as well. This point will be more fully 
discussed in a later section. 
 
